This volume contains C. D. Broad's Cambridge lectures on Ethics. Broad gave a course of lectures on the subject, intended primarily for Part I of the Moral Sciences Tripos, every academic year from 1933 - 34 up to and in cluding 1952 - 53 (except that he did not lecture on Ethics in 1935 - 36). The course however was frequently revised, and the present version is es sentially that which he gave in 1952 - 53. Broad always wrote out (...) his lectures fully beforehand, and the manuscript on Ethics, although full of revisions, is in a reasonably good state. But his handwriting is small and close and in places difficult to decipher. I therefore fear that some words may have been misread. There was an additional complication. In the summer of 1953 Broad revised and enlarged two sections of the course, namely the section on "Moore's theory" and that on "Naturalistic theories" (both sections occur in Chapter 4). The revised version of the section on Moore is undoubtedly superior to the earlier version, and I have therefore included it. But in my opinion this is not true of the new version of the section on naturalistic theories: although more comprehensive than the earlier version, it is not only repetitive in itself, but also repeats, sometimes almost verbatim, passages which occur elsewhere in the lectures. In brief, the new version is not fully integrated with the rest of the course. (shrink)

I will begin this paper by stating in rough outline what I consider to be the relevance of psychical research to philosophy, and I shall devote the rest of it to developing this preliminary statement in detail.

"It is... remarkable that Reeve's is the first new English translation since Fowler's Loeb edition of 1926. Fortunately, Reeve has done an excellent job. His version is not slavishly literal but is in general very accurate. It is also very clear and readable. Reeve is particularly to be congratulated for having produced versions of some of the more torturous passages, which are not only faithful to the text but also make good sense in English. The long and detailed introduction is (...) worth reading in its own right." --R. F. Stalley, _The Classical Review_. (shrink)

In over thirty lines of the Agamemnon I think I discern lurking in the apparatus of modern editions truths unnoticed by recent editors, and needing for the most part merely redivision, repunctuation, or reaccentuation to become recognizable. At a few points I offer alternative interpretations of readings that have been accepted by some at least among modern editors.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

I defend a strong version of the Kantian claim that actions done solely from duty have moral worth by (1) considering pure cases of acting from duty, (2) showing that love and sympathy, unlike a sense of duty, can often lead us to do the wrong thing, (3) carefully distinguishing moral from non-moral virtues, and (4) by distinguishing pathological sympathy from practical sympathy. Not only is acting purely from a sense of duty superior to acting from love and sympathetic feelings, (...) but the cold-heartedness found in Kant’s examples should be thought of as a virtue rather than a vice. (shrink)

THE FACULTY OF Arts at the University of Sydney is a disaster-area, and not of the merely passive kind, like a bombed building, or an area that has been flooded. It is the active kind, like a badly-leaking nuclear reactor, or an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in cattle.

As late-1990s developments in higher education suggest that a concept of a university will continue to be redefined, this text looks at the past, present and possible future changes in the nature of universities.

This chapter contains sections titled: Natural Beings The Polis as a Natural Phenomenon Correct and Deviant Constitutions The Naturalness of the Best Constitution Bibliography.

Joshua Greene and Peter Singer argue, on the basis of empirical evidence, that deontological moral judgments result from emotional reactions while dispassionate reasoning leads to consequentialist judgments. Given that there are good reasons to doubt these emotionally driven intuitions, they argue that we should reject Kantian ethics. I argue that the evidence does not support the claim that consequentialism is inherently more reason-based or less emotion-based than Kantian ethics. This is partly because the experiments employ a functional definition of ‘deontological’ (...) that is so broad as to include any non-consequentialist theory, including virtue ethics, divine command theory, and even rule-utilitarianism. Thus the experiments failed to capture the reasons behind the judgments. Also, the results of the experiments are partly due to the extensive use of moral dilemmas like the footbridge version of the trolley scenario. The options in these dilemmas involve different levels of moral thinking. The consequ.. (shrink)

Ethics, in the sense in which that word is used by philosophers, may be described as the theoretical treatment of moral phenomena. I use the phrase “moral phenomena” to cover all those facts and only those in describing which we have to use such words as “ought,” “right and wrong,” “good and evil,” or any others which are merely verbal translations of these.

Bing Crosby and Louis Armstrong, at a time when they were both millionaires many times over, recorded a song called "Gone Fishin'". Its theme was as familiar as it was implausible: how they would much rather sit by "some shady, wady pool", etc., than be enmeshed, as they were, in the feverish pursuit of money and fame. The record was a huge success, making the singers even richer and more famous than they had been before: which was, after all, their (...) intention in making it. It will hardly need saying that neither singer ever did in fact renounce show business and "go fishin'" instead; or that this experiment, if it had been tried, would have been an ignominious failure. It has been tried often enough. (shrink)

In his treatment of Marius in the Bellum Jugurthinum Sallust lays considerable stress on fortune2 and Marius' belief in divine assistance. I shall offer an analysis of these concepts in two sections: their use by Sallust himself in relation to Marius; their use in the earlier tradition about Marius.I. Though he is frequently mentioned in the earlier chapters of the B.J., our first formal introduction to Marius is in chapter 63. This chapter is of crucial importance. For it is the (...) response given by the haruspex to Marius when he chances to be making a sacrifice at Utica that prompts him to ask for leave to go and stand for the consulship, an office for which he has an ingens cupido. Because of the aristocratic superbia of his commander Metellus he is ‘snubbed’ by him and thenceforth ‘cupidine atque ira grassari; neque facto ullo neque dicto abstinere quod modo ambitiosum foret'. (shrink)